We study the question of basing symmetric key cryptography on weak secrets. In this setting, Alice and Bob share an n-bit secret W , which might not be uniformly random, but the adversary has at least k bits of uncertainty about it (formalized using conditional min-entropy). Since standard symmetric-key primitives require uniformly random secret keys, we would like to construct an authenticated key agreement protocol in which Alice and Bob use W to agree on a nearly uniform key R, by communicating over a public channel controlled by an active adversary Eve. We study this question in the information theoretic setting where the attacker is computationally unbounded. We show that singleround (i.e. one message) protocols do not work when k ≤ n 2 , and require poor parameters even when n 2 < k n. On the other hand, for arbitrary values of k, we design a communication efficient two-round (challenge-response) protocol extracting nearly k random bits. This dramatically improves the prior construction of Renner and Wolf [32] , which requires Θ(λ + log(n)) rounds where λ is the security parameter. Our solution takes a new approach by studying and constructing "non-malleable" seeded randomness extractors -if an attacker sees a random seed X and comes up with an arbitrarily related seed X , then we bound the relationship between R = Ext(W ; X) and R = Ext(W ; X ).
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of symmetric key cryptography: Alice and Bob share a secret W and wish to communicate securely over a public channel controlled by an active adversary Eve. In particular, we want the communication to be private and authentic. Of course, this problem is well studied and can be solved using basic cryptographic primitives, either under computational assumptions, or even in the information theoretic setting. However, the standard solutions for both settings assume that the secret W is perfectly (uniformly) random.
In practice, many secrets, such as human-memorable passphrases and biometrics, are not uniformly random. Even keys that start out perfectly random may become compromised, for example through side-channel attacks against hardware or due to a malware infiltration of the storage device. Although all security is lost if the adversary learns the secret in its entirety, it is often reasonable to assume that the compromise is only partial. This assumption is natural for side-channel attacks (and was formalized in [30, 19, 1] ) where the adversary does not have full access to the device, and for malware infiltration in the Bounded Retrieval Model [17, 11] , where the secret is made intentionally huge so that a malicious program cannot communicate it fully to an adversary. Lastly, it is conceivable that Alice and Bob, who do not share a secret initially, can use some physical means to agree on a key about which an eavesdropping adversary will only have partial information. This is, for example, the case in Quantum Key Agreement [3] and in the wiretap channel model [35] . In this work, we study a general setting which encompasses all of the above examples. We assume that Alice and Bob share a weak secret, modeled as a random variable W arbitrarily distributed over bit-strings of length n, about which an adversary Eve has some side information, modeled as a random variable Z correlated with W . We want to base symmetric key cryptography on minimal assumptions about the secrecy of W , and only require that W has at least k bits of entropy (conditioned on the side-information Z), where k is roughly proportional to the security parameter. As already mentioned, standard symmetric key primitives can be used in the case where Alice and Bob share a truly random key, and therefore we ask the following natural question.
Question 1: Can Alice and Bob use a shared weak secret W to securely agree on a nearly uniform secret key R, by communicating over a public and unauthenticated channel, controlled by an active attacker Eve?
One possible solution to this problem, is to use password authenticated key exchange (PAK) [7, 2, 25, 21, 8, 20] , where the secret W is used as a password. PAK allows Alice and Bob to agree on arbitrarily many random session keys using the secret W , and achieves strong security guarantees even when the entropy k is very low. On the other hand, all of the practical constructions of PAK either use the random oracle model or rely on a trusted common reference string. The only exception is the construction of [21] which, instead, requires many rounds of interaction and is not practically efficient. In addition, all of the constructions require the use of public key cryptography. Thus, even though we are in a symmetric key setting where Alice and Bob share a secure secret W , the use of PAK requires public key assumptions (and expensive public key operations) to take advantage of it. Also, PAK is a computational primitive, and only provides security when the attacker Eve is computationally bounded.
In contrast, we will study Question 1 in the information theoretic setting, where the adversary Eve is computationally unbounded. We call protocols that solve the problem of Question 1 in our setting (information-theoretic) authenticated key agreement (IT-AKA) protocols. Of course, IT-AKA cannot achieve all of the security guarantees of PAK. For example, IT-AKA can only be used once to convert a weak secret W into a uniformly random key R, and cannot be used to generate arbitrarily many session keys. Also, authenticated key agreement does not provide any security guarantees when the entropy k is very low (i.e. when the secret can be guessed with a reasonable probability). On the other hand, IT-AKA achieves information theoretic security and thus allows us to base all of symmetric key cryptography (information-theoretic as well computational) on weak secrets. Moreover, our constructions will be efficient (no public key operations) and do not require a common reference string or any other setup. For the rest of the paper, we will therefore assume that the adversary Eve is computationally unbounded.
A weaker variant of the our problem, called privacy amplification [5, 26, 4] , requires that Alice and Bob communicate over an authenticated channel (alternatively, that the attacker Eve is passive). In this setting, key agreement can be solved using a (strong) randomness extractor [31] , which uses a seed X that is made public to the adversary, to extract nearly uniform randomness R = Ext(W ; X) from a weak secret W . Privacy amplification can therefore be done in a one-round protocol, where Alice sends a seed X to Bob and both parties share the extracted key R.
The question of authenticated key agreement (when there is no authenticated channel and the adversary is active) was first studied by Maurer and Wolf in [27] , who constructed an IT-AKA protocol for the case when W has entropy k > 2n 3 (where n is the bit-length of W ). This was later improved to k > n 2 in the work of Dodis et al. [12] . Both of the above constructions are single-round, but only achieve authenticity at a price in the communication complexity (requiring at least n − k bits) and the size of extracted key (which is at most < 2k−n bits long, and thus far below the full entropy of W ). The most troubling aspect of these constructions, however, is the requirement that the entropy must exceed k > n 2 , which conflicts with our goal of basing symmetric key cryptography on minimal secrecy assumptions. Moreover, many natural sources of secret randomness, such as biometrics, are unlikely to satisfy this requirement.
In terms of negative results, Dodis and Spencer [16] showed impossibility of one-round message authentication if the only randomness available to Alice and Bob comes from a weak secret W whose entropy is k ≤ n 2 . However, in our setting, we assume that the parties also have access to a local (nonshared) source of perfect randomness. These two settings are very different and, when no perfect randomness is available, most cryptographic primitives (including privacy amplification) are impossible even if k > n 2 [29, 13, 6] . Therefore, we feel that the result of Dodis and Spencer has often been incorrectly interpreted (for example in [32, 12, 10] ) as showing the impossibility of one-round authenticated key agreement protocols in our more general setting, where perfect (nonshared) randomness is available. In this paper we rectify this discrepancy by proving a (non-trivial) generalization of the lower bound from [16] to our setting, thus showing that, unfortunately, single-round protocols do not exist when the entropy is k ≤ n 2 . In terms of positive results, an interactive IT-AKA for arbitrarily weak secrets (i.e. allowing entropy k ≤ n 2 ) was constructed by Renner and Wolf in [32] using a protocol which requires Θ(λ + log(n)) rounds of interaction, where λ is the security parameter. Several optimizations to the above protocol were proposed by Kanukurthi and Reyzin [24] , leading to important practical efficiency gains, but without improving the (large) asymptotic round complexity of the original protocol. Thus, there is a huge gap between the lower bound (which shows that at least two rounds of interaction are required) and the best prior constructions. We therefore turn our attention to the following question, which will be the central question of this work.
Question 2: What is the minimal amount of interaction required to achieve authenticated key agreement (IT-AKA) from arbitrarily weak secrets? In particular, is a two-round protocol possible?
In this paper, we answer Question 2 in the affirmative by giving an efficient construction of the first two-round IT-AKA protocol for arbitrarily weak secrets, and so bridge the gap between lower bound and construction. Our protocol only requires k ≥ poly(λ, log(n)), where λ is the security parameter, and thus allows for entropy k which is sub-linear in the size n of the secret.
1 Hence our construction is optimal in the amount of interaction and requires (essentially) minimal assumptions on the entropy of the secret W . Our protocol is also efficient in terms of communication complexity and extracts essentially all of the entropy of W into the final shared key. Therefore, even in the setting n 2 < k n, where less efficient one-round protocols are possible, our two-round construction may be preferred.
Our results employ a new technique which differs significantly from the prior work. The main novelty in our construction is the design of non-malleable extractors, which are an interesting primitive of independent interest. For nonmalleability, we consider an attacker who sees a random extractor seed X and produces an arbitrarily related seed X . We require that the relationship between R = Ext(W ; X) and R = Ext(W ; X ) is "bounded" in some well-defined manner. To our knowledge, this is the first work to explore the (non-)malleability properties of extractors, a problem which is particularly difficult since we must analyze security with respect to a very large class of distributions for W and methods for modifying the seed X. Our main construction of non-malleable extractors is based on the (seemingly unrelated) concept of alternating extraction, recently introduced in [18] . Using non-malleable extractors, we show how Alice can authenticate a message to Bob in a simple two-round (challenge-response) protocol. Lastly, we use this message authentication protocol as a tool for our construction of tworound authenticated key agreement.
We also present two orthogonal extensions of our basic scheme. In the first extension, we consider the fuzzy case where Alice and Bob have two different but correlated secrets WA, WB. In the second extension, we consider the case where the shared secret W is huge (e.g. as in the bounded retrieval model) and hence efficient protocols require locality -i.e. Alice and Bob can only access a small portion of W to run their protocol.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Notation. If W is a probability distribution or a random variable then w ← W denotes that a value w is sampled randomly according to W . For a randomized algorithm or function f , we use the semicolon to make the randomness explicit i.e. f (w; r) is the output of f with input w using randomness r. Otherwise, we let f (w) denote a random variable for the output of f on the value w. Similarly, for a random variable W , we let f (W ) denote the output of f on an input sampled according to W . We use U to denote a uniformly random distribution over bit strings.
Min-entropy and Statistical Distance. The statistical distance between two random variables A, B is defined by
This notion of entropy is useful in cryptography since it measures the predictability of W by an adversary. However, cryptographic secrets cannot usually be analyzed in a vacuum and we have to consider the conditional predictability of W when sampled according to some joint distribution (W, Z) where the adversary sees Z. Following [14] , the correct corresponding notion is average conditional min entropy defined by
We say that a random variable W is an (n, k)-source if it is distributed over {0, 1}
n and
Extractors and MACs. We review two information theoretic primitives that we will use extensively throughout the paper: randomness extractors and (one-time) MACs. A randomness extractor uses a random seed X as a catalyst to extract nearly uniform randomness R = Ext(W ; X) from a weak source W . A message authentication code (MAC) uses a private key R to produce a tag σ for a message µ such that an adversary who sees µ, σ cannot produce a valid tag σ for a modified message µ = µ.
We say that an efficient function Ext :
Definition 2. We say that a family of functions {MACr :
where R is uniformly random on {0, 1} n .
INTERACTIVE MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
In this section we study the problem of message authentication when Alice and Bob share an arbitrarily weak secret W about which an adversary Eve has some side-information Z. Alice wants to send an authenticated message µ A to Bob, in the presence of an active attacker Eve, who has complete control over the network and can modify protocol messages arbitrarily. Bob should either correctly receive µA, or detect an active attack and quit by outputting ⊥. For the case of perfectly random secrets W , it is well-known how to solve the above problem using message authentication codes (MAC), where the authentication protocol consists of a single round in which Alice sends her message µ A along with a tag σ = MAC W (µ A ). We show that this strategy does not (in general) extend to the case of weak secrets. Namely, one-round message authentication protocols are only possible if the entropy of the secret is at least k > n 2 . In addition, even when this condition does hold, a single-round protocol will have a communication complexity of roughly n − k bits. This lower bound often makes oneround protocols impossible, as in the setting of biometrics where the entropy-rate is often k < n 2 , or impractical, as in the Bounded Retrieval Model where a communication complexity of n−k bits would be huge and on the order of several gigabytes. Our lower bound applies to authentication protocols in which Alice can authenticate even a single bit. As mentioned in the introduction, this result can be thought of as a (non-trivial) extension of [16] to the setting where Alice and Bob have access to a local (non-shared) source of perfect randomness. In the rest of this section, we construct an efficient two-round authentication protocol that can tolerate entropy k n 2 , thus showing that the above lower bound does not extend beyond a single round. Our protocol (see Figure 1 ) has a simple challenge-response structure; Bob initiates the conversation by sending a random challenge to Alice, who then uses the secret W to compute a response that authenticates her message. In our protocol, the challenge that Bob sends to Alice is a seed X for some randomness extractor Ext. If the adversary does not modify the seed, then Alice and Bob will use it to derive a shared random key R = Ext(W ; X). Alice can then authenticate her message µ A , by using R as a key for a message authentication code MAC and sending the tag σ = MAC R (µ A ) along with µ A as her response to Bob. This gives us a very natural construction of a two-round authentication protocol based on an extractor and a MAC. Unfortunately, the construction is not secure in general. The problem is that Eve can modify the extractor seed X to some arbitrarily related value X , causing Alice to derive some incorrect, but possibly related, key R = Ext(W ; X ). Alice then uses R to (incorrectly) compute her response σ = MAC R (µA). In general, the incorrectly computed tag σ may allow the adversary to forge a valid tagσ = MAC R (µ B ) for a new message µ B = µ A under the correct key R. One can think of this as a related key attack where Eve learns the tag computed under a related key and forges a tag for a new message under the original key. Therefore, we must somehow restrict the adversarial attacks that Eve can perform by modifying the seed X. We use a two-pronged approach to combat this problem. Firstly, we construct an extractor which has some "non-malleability" property meaning that if an attacker sees a random seed X and comes up with a related seed X then we bound the relationship between the Bob's key R = Ext(W ; X) and Alice's incorrect key R = Ext(W ; X ). Secondly, we construct special MACs which are resistant to the limited types of related key attacks that our extractor allows. We then plug our special constructions of extractors and a MACs into the framework shown in Figure 1 , to construct a two round authentication protocol.
We present two instantiations of the above framework. As our first instantiation, we define fully non-malleable extractors, which essentially guarantee that randomness extracted under a modified seed is completely unrelated to that extracted under the original seed. We prove that (surprisingly) such extractors do indeed exist and can achieve very good parameters. We do so using a probabilistic method argument and therefore this approach does not help us in finding an efficient implementation. The strong non-malleability property essentially prevents Eve from performing any kind of related key attack and therefore, in the first approach, we can use standard one-time MACs for the response. In
Figure 1: A Framework for Message Authentication Protocols.
our second approach, we define a weaker non-malleability property that we call look-ahead and give an efficient construction of look-ahead extractors. We then construct a new message authentication code which is specifically tailored to withstand the limited types of related key attacks that lookahead extractors allow.
Approach 1: Fully Non-Malleable Extractors (non-constructive)
In this section, we define a powerful primitive called a (fully) non-malleable extractor. This is a seeded extractor which takes a weak secret W and extracts randomness R using a seed X. For the non-malleability property, we consider the following attack game. The adversary gets the seed X and comes up with an arbitrarily related seed X = X. The adversary then learns the value R extracted from W under the seed X . We require that the original randomness R still looks uniformly random even when given R , and thus the two values are completely unrelated.
Upon seeing the definition, it is not clear if non-malleable extractors can exist at all. In fact, one obvious attack would be for the adversary to choose a random seed X unrelated to X and thus learn some bits of information about W from R . In order for nmExt(W ; X) to then look random, we need to make sure that W still has at least bits of residual entropy left after bits are revealed, showing that we need < k 2
(i.e. we can extract at most half of the entropy) just to protect against an adversary who sees the value of the extractor at a random and unrelated seed X . Of course, an adversary that can choose an arbitrarily related seed X has significantly more power and there is no immediate reason to believe that we can defend against such an adversary at all. Surprisingly, using the probabilistic method, we show that non-malleable extractors do indeed exist and that the condition < k 2 is essentially sufficient. The proof requires a careful analysis of the dependencies introduced by the inclusion of a related-seed attacker A and thus is significantly more involved than the simple probabilistic method argument for standard extractors. There exists an (n, k, d, , ε) non-malleable extractor for any integers n ≥ k, d, and any ε > 0 as long as k > 2 + 3 log (1/ε) + log(d) + 9 and d > log(n − k + 1) + 2 log (1/ε) + 7.
Plugging in a non-malleable extractor and a one-time MAC into our main construction (Figure 1) gives us a two-round authentication protocol: Bob picks an extractor seed X, computes R = nmExt(W ; X) and sends X to Alice. Alice receives a (possibly modified) seed X and computes R = nmExt(W ; X ). She then uses R as a key to a standard MAC to authenticate her message µ A to Bob. It is fairly simple to analyze the security of the protocol. If X = X then, by non-malleability, the value R is unrelated to the random key R and hence the value σ = MAC R (µ A ) will not help the adversary produce a valid tagσ under the key R -not even to authenticate Alice's actual message µ A ! On the other hand, if X = X then R = R and hence we can rely directly on the security of the MAC to ensure that µ B = µ A . Therefore we get the following theorem and corollary for the existence of two-round message authentication protocols with nearly optimal parameters. 
Approach 2: Look-Ahead Extractors (efficient construction)
In this section, we define a weaker notion of non-malleability called look-ahead. A look-ahead extractor uses a random seed X to extract t blocks of randomness R 1 , . . . , R t from a secret W . Assume that a seed X is arbitrarily related to X and that the blocks R 1 , . . . , R t are extracted from W using X . We insist that any suffix Ri+1, . . . , Rt of the original sequence looks uniformly random, even when given the prefix R 1 , . . . , R i in the related sequence. In other words, the adversary cannot modify the seed and use the (incorrectly) extracted blocks to look ahead into the the original sequence of blocks. 
where
We note that this is a significantly weaker property than full non-malleability. For example, given a random seed X, there might be a related seed X such that laExt(W ; X) = laExt(W ; X ) with high probability. Nevertheless, we will show that look-ahead suffices for our needs. Our construction of a look-ahead extractor is based on the idea of alternating extraction, which was introduced by Dziembowski and Pietrzak in [18] as a tool for building an intrusion resilient secret sharing scheme. In the following section we review this concept using our own terminology and present an alternating-extraction theorem which captures the main ideas implicit in [18] , in an abstracted and (slightly) generalized form.
. . .
Figure 2: Alternating Extraction
Alternating Extraction. Assume that two parties, Quentin and Wendy, have values Q, W respectively such that W is kept secret from Quentin and Q is kept secret from Wendy. Let Extq, Extw be randomness extractors (with possibly different parameters) and assume that Quentin also has a random seed S 1 for the extractor Ext w . The alternating extraction protocol (see Figure 2) is an interactive process between Quentin and Wendy, which runs in t iterations. In the first iteration, Quentin sends his seed S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R 1 = Ext w (W ; S 1 ), sends R 1 to Quentin, and Quentin computes S 2 = Ext q (Q; R 1 ). In each subsequent iteration i, Quentin sends S i to Wendy, who replies with R i = Extw(W ; Si), and Quentin computes Si+1 = Extq(Q; Ri). Thus Quentin and Wendy together produce the sequence:
The alternating-extraction theorem says that there is no better strategy that Quentin and Wendy can use to compute the above sequence. More precisely, let us assume that, in each iteration, Quentin is limited to sending at most sq bits to Wendy who can then reply by sending at most s w bits to Quentin where s q and s w are much smaller than the entropy of Q, W (preventing Quentin from sending his entire value Q). Then, for any possible strategy cooperatively employed by Quentin and Wendy in the first i iterations, the values R i+1 , R i+2 , . . . , R t look uniformly random to Quentin (and, symmetrically, S i+1 , S i+2 , . . . , S t look random to Wendy). In other words, Quentin and Wendy acting together cannot speed up the process in some clever way so that Quentin would learn R j (or even distinguish it from random) in fewer than j iterations. We prove the following theorem essentially using the techniques of [18] . 
Theorem 9 (Alternating Extraction
and
the views of Aw, Aq respectively after the first i iterations (including their inputs and a transcript of communication) and ε
Construction of a Look-Ahead Extractor. At first it may seem surprising that alternating extraction (which is an interactive protocol) can help us in the construction of a non-malleable extractor (which is a non-interactive primitive). Our construction of a look-ahead extractor is relatively simple. We let X = (Q, S 1 ) be a seed, and define
where R1, . . . , Rt are generated as in equation (2). Essentially, the extractor uses the seed X = (Q, S1) to run (1)) follows directly from the alternatingextraction theorem (equation (3)).
Theorem 10. Given an (nw, kw −(2 )t, , , εw)-extractor
Extw and an (nq, nq − (2 )t, , , εq)-extractor Extq, our construction yields an (n w , k w , n q + , , t, t 2 (ε w +ε q ))-look-ahead extractor.
Proof. Follows from the above discussion showing how to construct a strategy Aq for Quentin given a malleability attacker A. Notice that the strategy A q sends s q = bits in each iteration. Also, we assume that Q is chosen to be uniformly random over {0, 1} n q and therefore k q = n q . The rest of the parameters follow directly from Theorem 9. Plugging in an efficient extractor construction from [22] , we get the following.
Theorem 11. For all integers n ≥ k and all ε > 0 there exist (n, k, d, , t, 
ε)-look-ahead extractors as long as k ≥ 2(t + 2) max( , O(log(n) + log(t) + log(1/ε)))
≥ O(t( + log(n) + log(t) + log(1/ε))) and d ≥ O(t( + log(n) + log(t) + log(1/ε))).
Authentication using Look-Ahead. We will plug the look-ahead extractor into our framework (Figure 1) 
It is simple to show that our construction ( Figure 1 ) is a secure message authentication protocol if we plug-in a lookahead extractor and a MAC with look-ahead security.
Theorem 13. Plugging a (n, k, d, , t, ε)-look-ahead extractor and a (m, s, , t, ε, δ)-MAC with look-ahead security into our framework (Figure 1) yields a (n, k, m, δ)-message authentication protocol with a communication complexity of d + m + s bits.
Proof. We can describe Eve through two adversarial functions A1, A2 where X = A1(X, Z) is the function used to modify the initial flow, and (µB,σ) = A2(X, Z, MAC R (µA)) is the function used to modify the response flow. Now, for any function A 1 (including ones which can leave the initial flow unmodified) the definition of look-ahead extractors ensures that the variables V = (X, Z), R = laExt(W ; X), R = laExt(W ; X ) satisfy the look-ahead property ((5) in Definition 12). Therefore, Definition 12 ensures that the probability of A 2 successfully producing (µ B ,σ) such that µB = µA and Bob accepts (µB,σ) is upper-bounded by δ.
We now proceed to construct a MAC with look-ahead security. To show the intuition behind our construction, we first (informally) analyze a simple variant for 1 bit messages. For For example, if S 1 := {1, 4}, S 2 := {2, 3}, then both of the ordered pairs (S 1 , S 2 ) and (S 2 , S 1 ) are top heavy. Therefore the collection Ψ = {S 1 , S 2 } is pairwise top-heavy. We show that any collection of pairwise top-heavy sets can be used to construct a MAC with look-ahead security. Therefore, to construct efficient MACs with look-ahead security, we must construct a large collection of sets which is pairwise top-heavy. We generalize our example of Ψ = { {1, 4} , {2, 3} } to many bits, by mapping an m bit message µ = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ {0, 1} m to a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , 4m} using the function (6) i.e. Plugging in our parameters for look-ahead extractors (Theorem 11) with those for MACs with look-ahead security (Corollary 2), we construct message authentication protocols with the following parameters. (n)+log(1/δ)) ). Moreover, the size of the MAC key (and thus the entropy loss of the protocol) is bounded by τ = 4m(m + log(1/δ)).
The parameters of our above construction are vastly suboptimal for all but very short messages (especially compared to our non-constructive existential results). However, we will see that we can use the above protocol efficiently as building block for authenticated key agreement by authenticating only a very short message. In turn, authenticated key agreement will allow us to build an authentication protocol for longer messages. Therefore, in Theorem 21, we will see that we can get efficient two-round message authentication proctors with significantly better parameters by constructing authenticated key agreement protocols first.
AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT
We now turn to the problem of authenticated key agreement (IT-AKA). As before, Alice and Bob share a secret W about which Eve has some side-information Z. They would like to run a protocol, in which they agree on a shared random key. More concretely, Alice and Bob each have candidate keys rA, rB respectively, which are initially set to the special value ⊥. At some point during the protocol execution, Alice can reach a KeyDerived state and Bob can reach a KeyConfirmed state. Upon reaching either of these states, a party sets its candidate key to some -bit value (not ⊥) and does not modify it afterwards. Informally, the KeyDerived, KeyConfirmed states should be interpreted as follows: (1) If Alice reaches the KeyDerived state, then she possesses a uniformly random candidate key, which remains private no matter how the adversary acts during the remainder of the protocol execution. However, she is not sure if her key is shared with Bob, or if Bob is even involved in the protocol execution at all. (2) Figure 3 : Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol the sender (Alice) would like to be assured that her key is private (and will remain private), but she does not need the key to be shared at the time that she prepares/sends her authenticated-ciphertext. On the other hand, the recipient (Bob) would like to know that the key he uses for decryption/validation is the same shared private key which was used by Alice. For this reason, we make our definition asymmetric, only requiring that Alice reaches KeyDerived (at which point she can prepare/send her authenticatedciphertext) and Bob alone reaches KeyConfirmed (at which point he can validate/decrypt). Notice, that this definition captures and generalizes prior definitions for one-round key agreement protocols ( [28, 12] ) where Alice distills a key r A on her own, goes into the KeyDerived state, and sends a single message to Bob. We therefore also generalize the notion of pre/post-application authenticity from [12] , where it was noted that, if Alice wants to use her key r A immediately after reaching KeyDerived (i.e. to encrypt and authenticate a message to Bob), we need to make sure that her use of the key does not help the adversary Eve break authenticity. Therefore, we will construct a two-round protocol meeting the stronger post-application authenticity guarantee where, even if the adversary is given (the entire) key rA, she cannot cause Bob to derive rB = rA. In particular, using this protocol, Alice can encrypt and authenticate a message to Bob in two rounds of interaction.
We begin with a lower-bound showing that single-round authenticated key agreement (even with pre-application security) is essentially impossible when k < , ε < 1 16 , must satisfy k > n 2 and have a communication complexity is at least n − k − 2 bits.
Construction.
We proceed to construct an efficient, tworound, IT-AKA protocol where Bob sends a message to Alice, Alice goes into KeyDerived and sends a reply to Bob, and Bob goes into KeyConfirmed (see Figure 3 ). Our construction uses the message-authentication protocols from Section 3 as building blocks. The main idea behind our construction is fairly simple; Alice uses the authentication protocol to authenticate an extractor seed X key to Bob who then uses it to extract a shared key with Alice. Essentially the same idea was used in [32] to construct authenticated key agreement from authentication protocols (with many rounds of interaction). However, the basic idea of authenticating a seed X key might not work in general, since the adversary Eve can potentially learn some information about W which is dependant on X key during the course of the authentication protocol, thus compromising the secrecy of the final key. Indeed, to overcome this complication, [32] needed to add extra rounds to their construction on top of the authentication protocol. In contrast, we show that this complication does not arise when the authentication protocol follows our framework ( Figure 1 ) and so our construction of IT-AKA as described above and shown in Figure 3 is secure and we do not need additional rounds.
The security of the above construction is easy to explain on an intuitive level. By the security of the authentication protocol, if Bob reaches the KeyConfirmed state, then X key = X key and therefore R A = R B , showing authenticity (even if Eve sees RA). For privacy, on the other hand, the only information that an active adversary might possibly get about W and which depends on X key , is the tag σ = MAC R auth (X key ). However, σ is independent of W when conditioned on R auth . Therefore, the keys R A , R B are secure as long as there is enough entropy left over in W conditioned on R auth and Z. We formalize this argument in Theorem 20. We then plug in the parameters for our two authentication protocols (non-constructive and constructive) to state the final parameters achieved by our IT-AKA protocols in Corollaries 3 and 4.
As mentioned at the end of Section 3.2, we can use our construction of IT-AKA (which uses interactive message authentication as a building block) to improve the efficiency of message authentication based on the look-ahead extractor. The idea is to perform key agreement with post-application authenticity and let Alice use her key r A as a key for a standard MAC to authenticate a long message efficiently in the second flow.
Theorem 21. We construct an efficient two-round (n, k, m, δ)-message authentication protocol for any integers n ≥ k, m and any δ > 0 as long as k > O log 2 (n) + log 2 (1/δ) + log(m) .
EXTENSIONS
The Fuzzy Case. We now extend our result to the "fuzzy case" where Alice and Bob have some highly-correlated, but possibly unequal, secrets WA, WB respectively. This can happen, for example, when the secret is a biometric and the variables W A , W B represent different (but hopefully very similar) scans of the same biometric.
2 Non-interactive (oneround) solutions for this setting in the case of passive attackers are called fuzzy extractors and were originally studied by [15, 14] . For the case of active attackers, such solutions are called robust fuzzy extractors and were originally constructed by [12] and improved upon in [23] . Of course, such solutions inherit our lower-bound, and require that the entropy of the secrets is at least k > n/2. Interactive solutions for this setting, which allow k ≤ n/2 appear in [33] and are optimized in [24] . Again, as in the non-fuzzy case, the prior solutions require many rounds of interaction (proportional to the security parameter). We now give a high-level outline for extending our two-round IT-AKA protocol to the fuzzy setting.
In the fuzzy setting, Alice and Bob need to perform information reconciliation to agree on the same shared secret. Using terminology from [14] , non-interactive informationreconciliation is called a secure-sketch and consists of two procedures (SS, Rec). Bob first computes a sketch Skt = SS(WB) of his secret value WB, and sends this sketch to Alice. Alice then runs an efficient recovery procedure to compute Bob's version of the secret W B = Rec(W A , Skt). The sketch is secure if it does not reveal much information about W B so that, for any Z, H ∞ (W B |Z, SS(W B )) ≥ H ∞ (W B |Z) − α for some small value α called the entropy loss. See [14] for a formal definition of secure sketches and efficient secure sketch constructions for several specific types of correlations of WA, WB (e.g. closeness with respect to hamming distance). Also, see the work of [33] for a general, but inefficient, construction of secure sketches for arbitrarily correlated variables (based on hash functions). We show how to implement (efficient) two-round authenticated key agreement in the fuzzy setting for any correlation of WA, WB for which there is an (efficient) secure sketch construction.
One idea of a construction for this setting is to first perform information-reconciliation (where Bob sends a sketch Skt of his secret to Alice) and then have Alice and Bob run the standard authenticated key agreement protocol using a shared secret W B .
3 Unfortunately, this may not be secure in general since Eve gets additional attack power by being able to modify the value of the sketch Skt = SS(W B ) sent by Bob to Alice. We argue that the above idea is secure when implemented with our IT-AKA protocol based on the alternating-extraction construction of look-ahead extractors. The key realization is that the look-ahead property (see Definition 12) Skt ) where X , Skt are adversarially chosen based on Skt, X. Intuitively, any such substitution attack translates directly to an adversarial strategy for Quentin in the alternating-extraction protocol and hence cannot break the look-ahead property. Since the look-ahead property is all we needed to prove the security of our authentication protocol and finally IT-AKA, we see that the security of these protocols carries over to the fuzzy setting.
The Bounded Retrieval Model.
The Bounded Retrieval Model was first proposed (concurrently) by [17, 11] and has since also been studied by [9, 18] . The main idea is to make Alice and Bob share an intentionally huge secret key (e.g. 10 GB). The size of the key is crucial in protecting against intrusion attacks where the adversary gets complete control over the storage device through some malware (i.e. a virus or trojan horse) which infiltrates Alice's or Bob's storage. It is assumed that, although the malware has complete access to secret data, it cannot communicate too much of it to the adversary (e.g. more than 4 GB), because of limits on bandwidth or implemented security measures against excessive communication. Therefore this scenario falls into our framework where Alice and Bob share a (now huge) secret W about which the adversary has side-information Z, such that the entropy of W given Z is large (e.g. more than 6 GB). Our lower bounds show that, even if the entropy of W is k ≥ n/2, the communication complexity of noninteractive (i.e. single-round) protocols will be at least n − k bits (e.g. 4GB), which is unrealistic. Interaction is therefore essential in this setting and, as presented, our protocols already achieve low communication complexity relative to the size of the secret W . However, the current solutions may not be efficient since they require the parties to read the entire secret to run the protocol. Therefore, we would like to have more efficient construction which also achieve locality: the parties need only read a small number of positions in W to run the protocol. We notice that, in our IT-AKA protocol based on the alternating-extraction construction of look-ahead extractors, the secret W is only read by the (standard) extractor Ext key and the look-ahead extractor Ext auth , the latter of which is constructed using two (standard) extractors Ext q , Ext w . By substituting a local extractor (defined and constructed by Vadhan [34] ) for all of the above extractor implementations, we get a construction of message authentication and IT-AKA protocols which also achieve locality.
